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in the previous year tend to reduce risk significantly. In the dollar case the adjustment to 
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to increase effort, as proxied by portfolio turnover. Since reserve managers should have a 
comparative advantage over the benchmark within a monthly horizon, possible 
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and performance by means of a convex scoring system linked to monthly, rather than 
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1. Introduction
1 
This paper aims to make an original contribution on four issues. First, it performs an empirical study 
on the relationship between ranking, risk taking and effort in the management of the ECB’s foreign 
reserves. This setting has never been explored before and, in a broad sense, it is representative of the 
under researched class of the official foreign exchange reserve portfolios, globally worth over 10 
trillion US dollars.
2 Second, our analysis is related to the existing studies on tournaments and risk 
shifting in the mutual fund industry, pioneered by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996). This literature 
has extensively investigated the management of equity funds, while one study has recently examined 
corporate bond funds (Adam and Guettler, 2011). We present the first analysis to our knowledge of a 
tournament involving actively managed high grade bond portfolios. This feature may fill a gap, since 
it is not obvious that the risk shifting hypothesis may extend to an environment where overall risk is 
much lower compared with equity portfolios and corporate bond portfolios. Our findings may thus 
have some bearing on managed bond portfolios in the private sector, that account for a large portion of 
the investment management industry.
3 Third, we examine the effect of ranking on portfolio managers’ 
effort, something that has not been attempted in previous empirical research. Finally, from an agency 
perspective, we discuss possible improvements in the incentives offered to ECB reserves managers via 
the ranking system. 
The purpose of the ECB’s foreign reserves is to finance possible interventions in the foreign exchange 
market. Based on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, the stock of these assets is the 
result of the initial transfer from participating National Central Banks (NCBs) and of the investment 
operations, as well as of interventions (Scheller, 2006). At the end of 2010 the ECB’s official foreign 
reserve assets were worth around €57 billion, of which €17 billion gold, €0.4 billion SDRs and the 
remainder in US dollar and Japanese yen assets. The shares of dollar and yen assets were around 76 
and 24 per cent respectively.  
The investment of the ECB’s foreign reserves is based on a central risk management function and a 
decentralized approach for investment operations involving the NCBs. Until 2005 each NCB used to 
manage one subportfolio in dollars and one in yen. With a view to improving efficiency, since January 
2006 an approach aimed at currency specialization has been introduced, resulting in a smaller number 
of actual portfolios. In any case, portfolio managers in each currency have been assigned a common 
                                                           
1 We are grateful to Luca Anderlini, Gioia Cellai, Rainer Haselmann, Anna Pavlova, Massimo Sbracia, Roberto 
Schiavi, Livio Stracca, Daniele Terlizzese, to two anonymous referees and to seminar participants at the ECB, 
Banca d’Italia and Karlsruhe 12
th Symposium on Finance, Banking and Insurance for their useful suggestions. 
2 The figure is as of June 2011; see the IMF COFER statistics. 
3 The 2011 Investment Company Factbook (www.icifactbook.org) reports that the share of net assets in bond and 
money market funds equals 45 per cent of the US mutual fund industry, or 5.4 trillion dollars out of 11.8 trillion 
dollars at the end of 2010. High grade securities are the main asset class in bond funds. One may take 45 per cent 
as an estimate of the share of bond portfolios in the net assets of mutual funds in the rest of the world, which are 
worth 12.9 trillion dollars in total (same source as above).     6 
benchmark over time, which has given rise to two investment tournaments. On a monthly basis the 
performance  of  the  individual  portfolios  is  assessed,  also  by  means  of  year to date  performance 
rankings of managers. Once a year a general report is produced and submitted to the Governing 
Council  of  the  ECB;  the  report  includes  the  annual  performance  ranking  of  the  NCB  portfolio 
managers for each currency. The allocation of mandates may be reviewed periodically if the need 
arises. 
The delegated framework and the risk control rules for the management of the ECB’s foreign reserves 
have proven in the field to be financially sound, as documented by the internal reports. These show in 
particular that for both currencies, in the years 1999 2010, the actual portfolios have outperformed on 
average the respective benchmarks net of transaction costs, and the move to currency specialization in 
2006 has led to an overall improvement in portfolio performance. The framework, inspired by the 
overarching principles of liquidity and security of the ECB’s foreign reserves, provides for them to be 
managed prudently in a way that maximises their value. 
Our interest in risk choices is stimulated by the observation that the actual portfolios make a limited 
use of the market risk budget. For instance, in 2010 the average utilization rate of the allowed budget 
for the portfolios was equal to 42 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively for the dollar and the yen. 
Utilization was generally lower in previous years. The question that we address is as follows: does the 
current ranking system affect portfolio managers’ risk taking and effort during the year? For this 
purpose we employ panel regressions on a detailed dataset of monthly performance, risk and turnover 
for each of the twelve managing NCBs (or pools of NCBs) that were active throughout the years 2002 
2009, i.e. in the last four years of the uniform approach (2002 2005) and in the first four years of 
currency specialization (2006 2009). Key to our setting is the fact that upfront monetary incentives are 
almost entirely absent and competition among portfolio managers is based on reputational credit. 
We find that risk shifting in response to ranking occurs even in the first half of the year, although it 
becomes much stronger in the second semester. Dollar managers shift all risk variables and, to a lesser 
extent, effort if their portfolio is performing below the benchmark, while above benchmark performers 
do not adjust on the basis of their ranking. We also detect a strong feedback from past year ranking for 
dollar managers who are below the benchmark: in the second semester they significantly reduce risk 
and effort. The inception of currency specialization as from 2006, involving a tighter tournament 
among a smaller group of reserve managers, has been accompanied by an increase of spread risk 
shifting in relation to interim ranking, and by some lessening of the other types of adjustment. In the 
yen case, interim ranking leads reserve managers to shift mainly spread risk and independently of 
relative return. The feedback from past year ranking is found for spread risk and effort. Currency 
specialization has led low ranking yen managers to increase effort. We interpret the empirical finding 
that  past  year  losers  systematically  reduce  risk  in  light  of  concavity  in  the  reputation  function, 
motivated by a concern for capital preservation, which seems higher among NCB foreign reserve     7 
managers  than  in  other  portfolio  tournaments.  As  a  result,  in  our  environment  the  manager’s 
(reputational) payoff is kinked, and reminiscent of that of the seller of a put option with an exercise 
price equal to the value of the benchmark portfolio. This feature, which explains the low usage of the 
risk budget, may cause a loss of performance. 
We then examine the implications of managers’ choices for the ultimate goal of the actual portfolios. 
A  story  from  the  sports  world  vividly  illustrates  the  role  of  scoring  and  ranking  in  contestants’ 
decision  making,  a  subject  that  has  been  widely  examined  in  the  literature  (e.g.  Ehrenberg  and 
Bognanno, 1990). Let’s assume that our rational stakeholder is a fan of Formula 1 racing. They love 
tight  competitions  and  the  drivers’  search  for  performance  during  each  race.  The  scoring  system 
assigns 25 points to the race winner, 18 to the second driver, 15 points to the third one, and so on 
down to 1 point for the tenth position, whereas those who classify below tenth get nil. The final score 
for the drivers’ title as well as the constructors’ title is the sum of the points earned during the season. 
One day the race organizer, in the attempt to raise the interest of the public for Formula 1, proposes a 
change in the ranking system. Under the new scheme each driver would earn a number of points equal 
to his own race time. At the end of the season the times/points would be summed up and the driver, or 
the team, with the lowest overall times/points would win the title. Which scoring system would the 
rational Formula 1 fan prefer? The answer seems obvious, and we leave it to the reader. We observe 
that in analytical terms the Formula 1 scoring function is highly convex in the arrival order, whereas 
the new hypothetical function would be linear in the race times.
4  The scoring/ranking system, together 
with the level of compensation, can clearly influence the agents’ strategies. 
An agency implication of the risk shifting evidence in the literature is that, by focusing attention on 
relative annual return, the mutual fund industry may effectively be changing managerial incentives 
from a long term to a short term perspective (Brown et al., 1996; van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen, 
2008).  In  our  setting  the  analogous  finding  might  lead  to  the  opposite  conclusion.  Owing  to  the 
monthly resetting frequency of the benchmark, the investment horizon which in principle reaps the full 
benefits of the ECB’s management framework is arguably very short, and equal to one month (Cardon 
and  Coche,  2004;  Koivu,  Monar  and  Nyholm,  2009).  However  in  practice  ECB  foreign  reserve 
managers  adopt  the  one year  horizon,  over  which  their  performance  is  eventually  assessed  and 
reputation awarded by the Governing Council. Therefore in our case the risk ranking relationship 
introduces  an  annual  orientation  which  may  conflict  with  the  length  of  the  efficient  investment 
horizon.  
                                                           
4  The  scoring  system  of  Formula  1  has  indeed  been  changed  several  times  in  recent  years  (see 
www.formula1.com). It should be clear that the example is made for general purposes and has no relationship of 
substance with the investment tournament for the ECB’s foreign reserves. The latter is by construction a highly 
prudent activity within the broader portfolio management business, whereby the maximum amount of risk that 
can be taken is capped very low (see section 3.1). From a risk perspective the foreign reserve management 
tournament is at most like an athletic race, definitely not like a car race.     8 
We then examine some implications of agency theory for the efficient design of the tournament (see 
Stracca,  2006  for  a  survey  of  delegated  portfolio  management  models).  General  results  of 
compensation theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983) and the model of Dybvig, 
Farnsworth and Carpenter (2010), which derives optimum incentives when portfolio managers’ effort 
and private signals are not observable, suggest that a convex reputation function might induce a more 
efficient  use  of  the  risk  budget.  An  intertwined  issue  is  the  discrepancy  between  the  investment 
horizon of the portfolios and the assessment horizon. In this perspective, we argue that a tournament 
applying a convex scoring function over a sequence of twelve monthly performance games would 
seem superior to the set up where a concave reputation function is applied to a single performance 
game lasting for twelve months. The rank order is a possible incentive compatible instrument for the 
aggregation of scores in different rounds. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to our analysis. Section 3 
describes the management framework and the tournament. Section 4 defines the variables and shows 
summary statistics. Section 5 presents the panel estimates on the effect of ranking on risk taking and 
effort  for  the  reserve  managers.  Section  6  examines  more  closely  individual  choices.  Section  7 
presents the normative discussion. Section 8 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. Related literature 
Our  analysis  is  directly  related  to  the  empirical  studies  of  fund  managers’  tournaments.  Past 
performance  is  the  main  determinant  of  fund  selection,  through  a  convex  flow performance 
relationship  (Gruber,  1996;  Chevalier  and  Ellison,  1997;  Sirri  and  Tufano,  1998);  hence  fund 
managers actively pursue the growth of the assets under management, which brings about a rise in the 
fees. This observation underpins the broad version of the tournament (or risk shifting) hypothesis, 
according  to  which  fund  managers  adjust  portfolio  composition  depending  on  year to date 
performance. The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis in its narrow sense version, according 
to which interim winners lock in their outperformance and reduce risk, while interim losers increase 
volatility in the attempt to catch up (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Brown et al., 1996; 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Performance in the previous years also displays a significant effect on 
risk positions: the more consistently portfolio managers have been losers (winners) in the past the 
more (less) likely it is that they will have an above average risk exposure (Brown et al., 1996). 
Subsequent empirical research has shown that the use of incentive fees magnifies the extent of risk 
shifting in an economically significant way (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2003); risk shifting may partly 
be a spurious consequence of survivorship bias (Qiu, 2003) and of returns correlation (Busse, 2001; 
Goriaev, Nijman and Werker, 2005); and risk shifting in its narrow version is less pronounced for 
funds that make an active use of derivative instruments (Koski and Pontiff, 1999). Tournaments take     9 
place not only in a given fund segment, but also within families of funds that belong to the same 
controlling  group  but  offer  alternative  investment  styles  (Kempf  and  Ruenzi,  2008).  Tournament 
behaviour is also detected via risk measures based on portfolio holdings (Schwarz, 2011). The analysis 
of employment relationships within fund management firms reveals that the amount of risk taking can 
also  be  affected  by  career  concerns,  and  that  the  probability  of  maintaining  or  improving  one’s 
position within the same firm may be concave in performance for younger managers (Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1999). Compared with compensation incentives, employment concerns may present offsetting 
effects on risk taking, and the latter type of incentives may even dominate the former, as in the case of 
a bear market (Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele, 2009). In the case of hedge funds, risk shifting may be 
influenced  by  high water  mark  provisions,  risk  of  fund  closure  and  the  choice  of  reporting 
performance to a database (Aragon and Nanda, 2010). 
On the theoretical side, a vast literature has modelled mutual fund tournaments and challenged the 
narrow sense risk shifting hypothesis, that losers gamble and winners index (Acker and Duck, 2006; 
Basak and Makarov, 2011; Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro, 2007; Chen and Pennacchi, 2009; Goriaev, 
Palomino  and  Prat,  2001;  Taylor,  2003).  The  degree  of  risk  tolerance  affects  the  risk ranking 
relationship and, under risk neutrality, may even cause winners to gamble (Basak and Makarov, 2011). 
Risk shifting may also be influenced by general market conditions (as in Acker and Duck, 2006). Very 
pertinent to our analysis is the result of Goriaev et al. (2001), who study the interplay between relative 
return objectives and ranking concerns. They show that the introduction of a ranking component in the 
compensation scheme generates risk taking incentives for an interim loser in the last period of the 
tournament. If the weight of ranking in the objective function is relatively large, then the risk taking 
incentives of the interim loser increase with the distance to the interim winner. A common thread in 
this literature is that the relevant measure for decision making is risk relative to the benchmark, rather 
than portfolio volatility. The empirical tests using relative risk measures are more clearly in favour of 
the narrow tournament hypothesis (Acker and Duck, 2006; Basak et al., 2007; Chen and Pennacchi, 
2009; Goriaev et al., 2001). Ngo and Nguyen (2011) have recently developed a tournament model 
where competing fund managers make a joint choice on risk levels and effort, and show that when the 
latter is costly the interim winner exerts higher effort and chooses a lower risk than the interim loser. 
Based on the notion that the cost of effort is high in bear markets, the empirical test lends support to 
the risk level predictions but it does not extend to those on the amount of managers’ effort. 
We  depart  from  previous  empirical  studies  as  regards  the  type  of  assets  under  management,  the 
analysis of effort and the testing methodology. On the first aspect, we are aware of only one study of 
the tournament hypothesis in the case of actively managed bond portfolios, namely Adam and Guettler 
(2011), whose main focus is on the use of credit default swaps by corporate bond funds in the US. In 
their case interim underperformers are found to increase the short multi name CDS positions during 
the  second  half  of  the  year,  a  credit  risk enhancing  choice  which  is  consistent  with  the  narrow     10 
tournament hypothesis. We look for the first time at portfolios of government and quasi government 
securities.  Our  complementarity  to  the  extant  research  seems  relevant,  mainly  because  the  ECB 
reserve portfolios present a much lower volatility compared with both equity portfolios and corporate 
bond portfolios; furthermore, on account of their institutional nature, the ECB portfolios offer very 
narrow risk taking opportunities vis à vis actively managed bond funds in the private industry (see the 
next section). As a consequence, support for the tournament hypothesis is far from granted in our case. 
We perform a clinical study on this issue, thanks also to the quality of the data. 
Second, until now the empirical study of mutual funds’ managerial effort (e.g. Cremers and Petajisto, 
2009; Xie, 2011) has tried to explain it in view of fund characteristics and of the time varying flow 
performance  relationship,  which  may  cause  changes  in  the  marginal  utility  of  effort.  We  try  to 
measure  the  amount  of  managerial  effort  and  seek  to  advance  the  analysis  by  linking  it  to  the 
incentives created by ranking. For this purpose we use portfolio turnover as a proxy of effort.  
In terms of testing methodology, past empirical research has generally examined ex post risk variables 
sampled yearly using semi parametric methods. For instance, Brown et al. (1996) employ a standard 
deviation ratio, given by the fund’s volatility after the interim performance assessment date divided by 
volatility up to that date. With one exception (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997), the studies which employ 
mutual fund holdings data to measure ex ante changes in risk positions are recent (Kempf et al., 2009; 
Schwarz, 2011; Adam and Guettler, 2011). Along this strand, we estimate panel regressions on the 
monthly response to ranking of ex ante risk positions relative to the benchmark, after controlling for a 
set of market variables.
5 Our risk variables are based on asset holdings and, being unaffected by 
subsequent market movements, they exactly pin down the intentional changes in risk positions. In 
particular, since the ECB’s foreign reserves are invested in fixed income instruments, we distinguish 
duration risk, spread risk and curve risk (the use of CDS is not allowed, see below). On account of the 
closed nature of the tournament, whereby the number of contestants is fixed and the year to date 
performance ranking of each portfolio manager is known to all peers every month, we directly employ 
the year to date rank order as our key explanatory variable. 
 
3. Set-up 
3.1 General framework 
The purpose of the ECB’s foreign reserves is to finance possible ECB interventions in the foreign 
exchange market. Such interventions have occurred twice since the ECB was created, in September 
and November 2000. The foreign reserve portfolios may also be used to finance the ECB's part of 
                                                           
5 The use of multivariate panel regressions has a precedent in Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) and Kempf et al. (2009).     11 
concerted interventions in the foreign exchange market, such as for example the intervention of 18 
March 2011 following the tragic events in Japan.  
ECB foreign reserves initially comprised transfers of foreign reserve assets to the ECB from the NCBs 
of the euro area countries, in proportion to each NCB’s capital share in the ECB (Scheller, 2006, ch. 
3). When new countries join the euro area, their NCBs also transfer foreign reserve assets to the ECB, 
in the same proportion as the other NCBs. Over time, the ECB’s foreign reserves may increase or 
decrease as a reflection of portfolio returns and of purchases or sales of foreign currency by the ECB. 
In addition, the ECB may call upon the euro area NCBs to transfer additional foreign reserve assets if 
needed.
6  
In  order  of  priority,  the  high level  objectives  of  the  investment  framework  are  defined  as  being 
“liquidity, safety, return”. Three management layers for each currency are envisaged: the strategic 
benchmark, the tactical benchmark, and the investment portfolios. The strategic benchmark is decided 
upon by the ECB’s Governing Council on the basis of a proposal put forward by the risk management 
function of the ECB (detailed information can be found in Koivu, Monar and Nyholm, 2009). The 
Council then assigns two portfolio management mandates (see ECB, 2006). The first envisages the 
outperformance of the strategic benchmark by the tactical benchmark, the positions of which are 
reviewed and possibly changed once a month; this mandate has been given to the ECB’s Investment 
Committee. The second mandate envisages the outperformance of the tactical benchmark by the actual 
portfolios managed by the NCBs.
7  
The investment opportunities and risk limits can be summarized as follows (see also Manzanares and 
Schwartzlose, 2009). There is a positive list of eligible investment instruments for each currency, 
including government securities, securities issued by selected supranational institutions and agencies, 
and BIS instruments. Cash management operations include bank deposits, repos and reverse repos, 
while some derivative contracts are also allowed, in the form of interest rate and bond futures, interest 
rate swaps and fully hedged foreign exchange swaps. With the exception of government securities, 
each investment class is subject to maximum risk limits of two types: individual issuer limits, in 
                                                           
6 Within the Eurosystem, which comprises the ECB and the euro area NCBs, total foreign reserves amounted to 
around €591 billion equivalent at the end of 2010, of which around €57 billion were held by the ECB and around 
€534  billion  were  held  by  the  NCBs.  The  purposes  of  the  NCBs’  foreign  reserves  include:  international 
obligations  (e.g.  holdings  of  IMF  special  drawing  rights);  optimization  of  balance  sheet  structure;  and 
preparedness to transfer additional foreign reserve assets to the ECB if needed. A significant portion of the 
Eurosystem’s foreign reserves is made up of gold holdings, which accounted for €366 billion equivalent (or 62 
per cent) at the end of 2010.  
7 This is in line with various studies that point to the prospects for active management to add return to fixed 
income portfolios (e.g. Boyd and Mercer, 2010). This approach has benefits beyond the additional returns it 
generates, in particular in terms of market intelligence; the operational expertise it requires, which is useful not 
only  for  investment  operations  but  also  for  policy  operations;  and  the  generation  of  ideas  which  can  be 
incorporated in the composition of the benchmark portfolios over time. As a corollary, the portfolio managers 
must not receive any inside information about monetary and exchange rate policies of the ECB or other central 
banks or authorities.     12 
absolute value, and sector limits, as a percentage of portfolio size. These limits are designed to contain 
credit risk and liquidity risk. Besides, market risk is controlled via a ceiling on the actual portfolios 
relative VaR (one day horizon, 99 per cent confidence level) compared with the tactical benchmark 
and on the tactical benchmarks’ relative VaR vis à vis the strategic benchmarks. Almost all eligible 
securities types are included in the benchmarks. 
The risk  exposure  taken  by  portfolio  managers  vis à vis  the  tactical  benchmark  derives  from  the 
“signals” they collect in their daily market analysis. The risk of an actively managed bond portfolio 
can be broadly grouped in three categories. First, portfolio managers may try to outguess the changes 
in the level of the yield curve, leading to an adjustment of the actual portfolio duration relative to the 
benchmark duration (duration risk). For instance, if a portfolio manager forecasts a rise in yields 
(beyond what is already incorporated in the choice of the tactical benchmark), he will shorten the 
duration of the trading portfolio below that of the benchmark. Second, portfolio managers may form 
an expectation on the level of the yield spread of credit (i.e. non government) instruments compared 
with the treasury yield curve, which would cause an adjustment in the share of credit instruments 
relative  to  the  benchmark  (spread  risk).  Third,  portfolio  managers  may  entertain  views  on  the 
evolution of specific segments of the yield curve which, other things being equal, would lead to an 
adjustment of the shares of individual time buckets compared with the benchmark (curve risk). 
The risk controls are implemented through a portfolio management IT system which connects the 
entire network. The actual portfolios and the benchmarks, constituted by individual securities, are 
marked to market down to each individual component and time bucket in real time, via a continuous 
link  of  the  IT  system  with  price  vendors.  Besides,  the  system  computes  the  so called  duration 
contribution (i.e. the duration share) of each component of the benchmark and of the portfolios.
8  
Until the end of 2005, each NCB was involved in managing both a US dollar portfolio and a yen 
portfolio. Since 2006, with a view to achieving efficiency gains, portions of the portfolios are allocated 
to  each  NCB  or  pool  of  NCBs  that  expresses  interest  in  being  involved  in  ECB  foreign  reserve 
management. At the end of 2010 there were nine portfolios for the US dollar and six portfolios for the 
yen. Among these, three portfolios were pools between pairs of NCBs carrying out this activity jointly. 
The NCBs comprising the analysis, singularly or in pools, are those of Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, Finland, France, Greece Cyprus, Ireland Malta, Italy, Luxembourg Slovenia, the Netherlands, 
                                                           
8 The duration contribution of a given component of the portfolio is defined as the average duration of that 
component multiplied by the ratio of the component value over total portfolio value. Hence, the sum of all 
contributions adds up to the portfolio duration. The IT system enables portfolio managers to evaluate in real time 
the effect of any transaction on their exposure even before the transaction is made, thus contributing to highly 
informed risk taking decisions. For instance, if a dollar portfolio manager wants to increase the share of the 
credit instruments relative to the benchmark by adding, say, 50 million dollars’ worth of an agency bond, he may 
obtain the absolute and relative changes in the portfolio value, duration, VaR, etc. that would result from the 
transaction at prevailing market prices, as well as the duration contribution of the credit component before and 
after the transaction. Likewise, the system can work out the amount of the agency bond that should have to be 
purchased in order to obtain an increase in the exposure to credit instruments by x duration contribution years.     13 
and Portugal.
9 For confidentiality reasons, in the analysis that follows each desk of national dealers is 
indicated by a random code, ranging from M1 to M12. 
Considering  the  experience  so  far  with  ECB  foreign  reserve  management,  the  efficiency  of  the 
strategic benchmark can be confirmed ex post by comparing its returns with the returns of simpler 
investment strategies presenting similar risk, like investing in bills or short term bonds. For example, 
strategies consisting of rolling over investments in three month or six month Treasury bills or two 
year  Treasury  notes  would  have  achieved  average  yearly  returns  of  2.75,  2.98 and  3.30  per  cent 
respectively  over  the  period  from  January  1999  to  December  2010,  while  the  ECB's  US  dollar 
strategic benchmark returns (calculated in the same manner) were 3.96 per cent over the same period. 
For the Japanese yen, the roll over of investments in six month or twelve month Japanese government 
bills or two year government bonds would have achieved average yearly returns of 0.19, 0.23 and 0.43 
per cent respectively, while the ECB's Japanese yen strategic benchmark returns were 0.40 per cent. 
The objective of outperforming the strategic benchmark can thus be considered as rather challenging. 
In terms of actual investment performance, Table 1 shows the returns achieved by the actual portfolios 
compared with the strategic benchmarks. These excess returns have been positive in eleven out of 
twelve years for the US dollar portfolio and nine out of twelve years for the yen portfolio. Of the 
average yearly excess return of 12 basis points on both portfolios combined, around three quarters 
reflected the investment decisions made at the level of the actual portfolios by NCBs. 
 
3.2 The tournament 
The stylized facts about the foreign reserve management tournament are as follows. The objective of 
the actual portfolios is to outperform the tactical benchmark, and the assessment horizon for practical 
purposes is the calendar year, corresponding to the horizon for reporting to the Governing Council. 
Since the distribution of reserves reflects the NCBs’ capital share, the flow performance relationship 
and the ensuing incentive structure of the private sector do not apply. The only type of global reward 
consists  in  good  or  bad  reputation  at  the  Governing  Council  level  as  a  consequence  of  national 
performance and/or ranking in the previous year. The best portfolio managers obtain praise, from the 
ECB and from home; those who lag behind at the very least provoke a few raised eyebrows. 
Other types of reward in relation to performance are left to the discretion of individual NCBs. A 
survey among them has shown that in the sample period only two out of twelve envisaged a bonus 
related to the achievement of an annual ranking target set by the board, and the bonus was relatively 
small compared with base salary.  In one case the NCB board set a performance target, although 
without attaching a bonus. Four NCBs, including the ones that paid a bonus, foresaw other forms of 
                                                           
9 The NCB of Slovakia, which became a portfolio manager for the ECB’s foreign reserves upon entry into the 
Eurosystem in January 2009, has not been included in the analysis owing to the limited historical sample.     14 
discretionary reward related to performance and/or ranking, mainly in terms of career development. 
Broadly speaking, in the medium term consistent achievement or losses reveal the portfolio manager’s 
skills  and  contribute  to  positive  or  negative  career  development,  and  thus  indirectly  to  monetary 
reward. These employment incentives generally punish poor results less severely than in the private 
sector, in the sense that employment relationships at NCBs are quite often tenured. However, although 
with different modalities compared with the mutual fund market, peer pressure and competition are 
clearly at work in the management of the ECB’s reserves as well. In one aspect the ECB reserve 
management tournament is even more testing than the mutual fund tournament. Whereas in the latter 
case the number of competitors is usually in the hundreds, in the ECB’s case the number of players is 
below ten, implying very close scrutiny. 
In the majority of cases in which specific internal targets are not set, anecdotal evidence gathered from 
NCB portfolio managers indicates that they perceive a concave award of reputational credit over the 
final  ranking:  the  negative  reward  for  performing  badly  is  larger  in  absolute  terms  than  that  for 
performing well, a feature which generates risk aversion over annual portfolio performance relative to 
the  benchmark  return.  This  shape  for  the  reputation  function  is  usually  explained  by  portfolio 
managers  with  capital  preservation  concerns  which,  although  already  reflected  in the choice  of a 
prudential strategic benchmark with narrow deviation bands, permeates the culture of foreign reserves 
dealers and of their management. At the NCB level, in some cases the mandate to dealers can be 
described by the precept “first and foremost outperform the benchmark, then try to rank well”.
10  
We  conjecture  that  the  incentives  offered  to  reserve  managers  during  the  year  and  their  rational 
reaction to performance ranking may be in accordance with the tournament hypothesis, and we set out 
to test this hypothesis. 
 
4. Data 
We  seek  to  describe  the  managers’  choice  variables  along  two  dimensions:  risk  and  effort.  We 
therefore construct monthly time series of the type  c t i x , , , where the generic variable x is observed 
over manager i = 1,…, 12 and month t, ranging from January 2002 to December 2009. Each variable 
refers to a currency portfolio c = USD, JPY. In the years 2002 2005 all twelve NCBs, or pools thereof, 
used to run a dollar portfolio and a yen portfolio. During 2006 2009 our sample includes eight dollar 
portfolio managers and six yen portfolio managers (two NCBs manage both currencies). For each of 
them we exploit the availability of detailed data from the aforementioned portfolio management IT 
system of the ECB. To capture the different dimensions of risk we construct three variables: 
                                                           
10  These  concerns  may  have  similar  effects  compared  with  the  private  sector,  where  career enhancement 
incentives may be concave in performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).     15 
Duration risk:  this  variable  measures  the  duration  exposure  of  the  portfolio  relative  to  the 
benchmark. It is defined as the absolute difference in years between the modified 
duration of the portfolio and that of the tactical benchmark, both observed on the last 
day of the month. 
Spread risk:  this measures the spread exposure of the portfolio relative to the benchmark and is 
defined as the absolute difference between the duration contribution of the spread 
instruments (deposits, BIS, supranationals, agencies) in the portfolio and that of the 
tactical benchmark, in years, at month end.
11 
Curve risk:  this variable measures the curve exposure of the portfolio relative to the benchmark, 
net of Duration risk. It is defined as the sum of the absolute differences between the 
duration contribution of each time bucket in the portfolio and the corresponding value 
for the benchmark, minus Duration risk, in years, at month end.  
Effort is proxied by the following variable: 
Turnover:  the  ratio  between  monthly  portfolio  turnover  and  portfolio  size,  covering  all 
transactions (cash management, securities, and derivatives). 
We note that our risk variables might also be viewed as proxies of (unobservable) effort, since they are 
computed as the sum of absolute differences in portfolio shares compared with the benchmark. For a 
fund manager, departing from the passive replication of the benchmark involves not only a conscious 
act of risk taking but also hard work in terms of market analysis, price capture, security transactions, 
back office work, etc. This reasoning has recently induced Cremers and Petajisto (2009) to propose the 
“active share” measure of managerial efforts for equity mutual funds, which is basically the same 
approach used in the calculation of our variables Duration risk, Spread risk and Curve risk. In our 
case, since each of the three risk variables exactly matches one key dimension of risk in bond portfolio 
management, we prefer to think of our three variables as primarily risk measures. To the extent that 
the active share notion is more generally valid, there is clearly a positive association between risk and 
effort, and our subsequent inference on risk taking may also be indicative of patterns in managerial 
effort, in addition to what we derive from the study of Turnover. 
Our key explanatory variables are: 
                                                           
11 A numerical example may help. In December 2002 the duration of the dollar portfolio held by Manager 1 (or 
M1) was equal to 2.06 years, against 2.03 years for the corresponding tactical benchmark. Hence, the Duration 
risk of M1 was equal to 0.03 years. In the same month the spread instruments in M1’s portfolio had a duration 
contribution of 0.80 years, against a value of 0.45 for the tactical benchmark, i.e. the portfolio was overweighted 
in spread instruments. M1’s Spread  risk was thus equal to 0.35 years. Incidentally, this is also the maximum of 
that variable for M1 in the sample period (see Table 2).     16 
Rank:  the year to date return ranking among all portfolios in the same currency.
12 The raw 
ranking ranges between 1 (best interim performer) and 12 (worst interim performer) in 
the years before currency specialization, i.e. from 2002 to 2005, and from 1 to 8 (6) in 
the years 2006 2009 for the dollar (respectively the yen). For homogeneity, Rank is 
normalized to vary between 1 and 8 (6 for the yen) through the whole sample period. 
In the regressions we use the lagged value, i.e. Rank-1, which is strictly predetermined 
relative to the endogenous variables, and made known to all reserve managers in the 
first week of the month following the reference month. 
Last year rank: the final rank among reserve managers over the previous calendar year, normalized 
like Rank. This variable, which is constant for each manager during the year, measures 
the effect of the last completed tournament over current choices. 
Based on the previous discussion, we advance the hypothesis that lagged Rank will directly affect 
managers’  effort  and  risk taking,  along  its  three  dimensions  (duration,  spread,  and  curve).  For 
simplicity we conjecture a linear relationship between Rank and each dependent variable: those who 
rank in the lower half of the distribution (i.e. with larger values of Rank) from the beginning of the 
year to the previous month will increase risk and effort linearly. Conversely, those who rank in the top 
half of the distribution will reduce risk and effort. 
Last year rank might have a positive effect on risk and effort, as found in the mutual fund sector. 
However, if our anecdotal conjecture on the asymmetric reward function of portfolio managers is 
indeed at work, we could also see risk averse behaviour on the part of past losers, and Last year rank 
would display a negative effect on risk. 
Consistently with the literature, we hypothesize that risk shifting will be more pronounced in the 
second half of the year, when the time to the end result becomes shorter. Besides, we try to ascertain 
whether risk shifting in the second semester is affected by the portfolio return being above or below 
the benchmark return, since it could be argued that a low ranking manager might feel less pressure to 
gamble if his cumulated portfolio performance is positive. 
Our regression strategy is as follows: first, we use ranking variables that measure the undifferentiated 
effect, if any, over the year (lagged Rank and, respectively, Last year rank); second, we measure the 
differential effect of the same ranking variables in the second semester; third, limiting ourselves to the 
second semester, we measure the differential effect of the same variables when the portfolio manager 
has achieved a positive performance.  Then we construct the following variables: 
                                                           
12 We consistently use the term performance to mean the difference between portfolio return and benchmark 
return, which can have positive or negative values. By construction, our monthly ranking variables based on 
performance  are  identical  to  those  which  would  have  been  obtained  based  on  absolute  return,  since  the 
benchmark return is the same across portfolios.     17 
H2 rank:   the interaction between lagged Rank and an indicator variable equal to 1 from July to 
December  and  0  otherwise.  The  regression  coefficient  measures  the  incremental 
effect, if any, of Rank in the second semester. 
H2 above bmk:  the interaction between H2 rank and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the cumulated 
performance in relation to the benchmark up until the previous month is positive. The 
regression coefficient measures the incremental effect, if any, of the portfolio return 
being above the benchmark return. In the second semester the total risk shifting effect 
is given by the sum of the base effect of Rank plus the incremental effect of H2 rank 
(for all) plus the effect of H2 above bmk (for positive performers only). 
H2 last year:   is equal to Last year rank from July to December, and 0 otherwise. Analogously to H2 
rank, this variable captures the presence of the incremental effect of Last year rank in 
the second semester. 
H2 last above: the interaction between H2 last year and the positive performance indicator variable. In 
the second semester total risk shifting related to last year’s ranking is the sum of the 
base effect plus the incremental effect of H2 last year (for all) plus the effect of H2 
last above (for positive performers in the current year). 
We  also  employ  some  control  variables,  aiming  to  characterize  the  state  of  the  market  in  a 
parsimonious way. By construction they are manager invariant: 
Term spread:   the slope of the yield curve. It is defined as the difference between 10 year and 2 year 
government bond yields, in percentage points, at month end. We will use the lagged 
value, Term spread 1. 
Ted spread:  the  difference  between  the  3 month  Libor  rate  and  the  3 month  T bill  rate,  in 
percentage points, at month end. This variable measures the credit risk in the economy 
for the dollar case. We will use Ted spread 1. 
OIS spread:  the difference between the 3 month Libor rate and the 3 month overnight indexed 
swap rate, in percentage points, at month end. Like Ted spread, it measures credit risk 
in the case of the yen. We use OIS spread 1. 
Bond  volatility: the  annualized  historical  volatility  of  the  price  of  10 year  government  futures 
contracts, for current delivery, taken over the last sixty working days, in percentage 
points, at month end. This variable is a proxy of market volatility at the long end of 
the curve. Like Term spread, this variable is available for both currencies. We use its 
lagged value.     18 
The choice of the control variables reflects their role as key market indicators for portfolio decisions, 
the widespread use by market practitioners and their availability throughout the sample period. The 
source of these variables is Bloomberg. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics on the dependent variables in the dollar case. The random codes for 
the managing NCBs or NCB pools are consistent throughout the sample period. Therefore, since eight 
NCBs or NCB pools have continued to manage a dollar portfolio after currency specialization, in their 
case we collect explanatory variables in both regimes (96 monthly observations). The remaining four 
NCBs have withdrawn from the dollar as from 2006, and we thus collect the variables only until 2005 
(48 observations). 
We note inter alia that manager 10, who was active until 2005, always kept a neutral duration position 
(Duration risk=0 on average) and a small spread risk exposure. Manager 5 maintained on average a nil 
spread exposure. Among the moderate duration risk and spread risk takers we also note manager 12. 
Manager 8 is the one who  likes  taking risks most, showing  relatively  high values  for  average  
Duration risk (0.07  years), Spread risk (0.21 years) and Curve risk (0.59 years), although he achieves 
this with a low value of Turnover (0.49, i.e. 49 per cent of portfolio size). 
Table  3  provides  analogous  statistics  for  the  yen  portfolios.  In  this  case  we  collect  explanatory 
variables for six NCBs throughout the sample period, while for the remainder we only have data for 
the uniform approach period of 2002 2005. Interestingly, we observe that a large number of reserve 
managers does not take spread risk positions: some of them left the tournament as from 2006 (M1, 
M3, M4, M5), while others are still active under currency specialization (M2, M10, M11, M12). On 
average  the  yen  managers  show  lower  Turnover  values  compared  with  the  dollar  managers.  The 
traders with an average turnover ratio above unity are M4 and M8, who left in 2006, plus M6 and M9, 
who are still in the game. 
A general remark on these statistics is that Turnover, our effort proxy, varies widely among reserve 
managers, particularly in the dollar case. One reason may be related to the dispersion in the absolute 
size of the portfolios. Smaller portfolios are more flexible to manage because they involve a lower 
absolute transaction size to achieve any given relative risk position. Besides, some managers may 
actively use futures contracts or liquidity management operations, involving a higher gross turnover. 
The summary statistics on the USD control variables between 2002 and 2009 are listed in Table 4, 
while Table 5 gives the corresponding figures for the yen market. The dollar market variables show 
higher average values and greater dispersion compared with the yen variables.     19 
5. The effect of ranking 
We  recall  our  key  question:  does  ranking  in  its  twofold  characterization  (year to date  and  from 
previous  year)  affect  risk taking  and  effort  at  the  individual  level?  For  this  purpose  we  adopt  a 
stepwise approach. In this section we present the results of the following regressions starting with the 
dollar (the currency subscript is omitted for simplicity): 
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where the dependent variable Y is represented alternatively by Duration risk, Spread risk, Curve risk, 
Turnover.  We  use  panel  regression  estimates  with  fixed  effects,  measured  by  the  i u   term.  This 
specification involves a number of simplifying assumptions. In particular, all relationships among the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variables are assumed to be linear. The presence of individual 
effects is captured by  i u : risk taking and effort between any two portfolio managers i and j may differ 
only by a constant shift factor equal to  ) ( j i u u - , and over time all managers are assumed to react in 
the same way to changes in the explanatory variables. 
The dependent variables are extremely volatile and complex to model, reflecting a number of factors 
and idiosyncratic preferences that are difficult to capture with the available explanatory variables. Not 
surprisingly,  the  R squared  values that  we  obtain are  rather low.  Nonetheless,  for  our  hypothesis 
testing we rely on the coefficients t statistics computed with robust standard errors. 
Table 6 presents the results of equation (1) for the dollar portfolios where the dependent variable is 
Duration risk. The first column section lists the results for the entire sample period. It shows a highly 
significant constant term equal to 0.07 years and the negative effect of both the term spread and the 
Ted spread on duration risk. The base effect of ranking  ( ) 1 g  is nil. Risk shifting however takes place 
in the second semester, as revealed by a positive and highly significant value of  2 g , equal to 0.006. 
This implies that, other things being equal, the reserve manager with the lowest interim ranking (H2 
rank=8) displays a greater value of duration risk compared with the average rank (H2 rank=4.5) by 
(0.006*3.5=) 0.021 years. Interestingly, the value of  3 g  equal to  0.006 shows that risk shifting is 
entirely offset if the portfolio manager has achieved a positive performance. This reveals that risk 
shifting takes place asymmetrically around the value of the benchmark return. The reserve managers 
who achieve a positive interim performance do not adjust duration risk; those that remain below the 
benchmark shift duration risk in line with their ranking position in the second half of the year.     20 
Turning to the effect of past year ranking, we find an insignificant base coefficient  1 d . Risk shifting 
materializes in the second half of the year, when the value of  2 d , highly significant and equal to  
0.006, shows that losers in the previous tournament reduce duration risk, as could be conjectured on 
the basis of the managers’ anecdotal evidence. Again, we find an asymmetry around the benchmark 
return: the value of  3 d , equal to 0.005, reveals an almost full offset of the past ranking effect for 
reserve managers who are currently above the benchmark return. 
We  also  ran  equation  (1)  separately  during  the  uniform  management  period  and  the  currency 
specialization period. The results for duration risk are reported in Table 6 in the second and third 
column section respectively. In the uniform management period the market variables are no longer 
significant,  while  the  risk shifting  coefficients  are  smaller  and  show  the  same  patterns  as  in  the 
regression for the entire sample: asymmetric duration risk shifting occurs as a response to current 
ranking  ( ) 2 3 3 2 , 0 , 0 g g g g - = < >  as well as to past year ranking  ( ) 3 2 3 2 , 0 , 0 d d d d - = > < . 
In the currency specialization period duration risk responds negatively to the term spread and to the 
Ted spread, while most of the risk shifting effects are no longer significant. The only significant effect 
is related to Last year rank, the base variable which covers the whole year, with  008 . 0 1 - = d . While 
in the years 2002 2005 the effect of past ranking on current duration risk was found in the second 
semester  only,  during  2006 2009  the  reserve  managers’  concern  about  their  past  score  is  more 
pervasive:  it  weighs  on  duration  risk  choices  all  year  round,  and  independently  of  the  level  of 
performance. 
The estimates of equation (1) as applied to Spread in the dollar portfolios are reported in Table 7. In 
the full sample period we note that spread risk varies inversely with the Ted spread and directly with 
bond futures volatility. The base effect of Rank is equal to  0.009. In the second semester, the estimate 
of  2 g   turns  positive  as  expected  and  is  equal  to  0.023,  while  we  observe  again  the  offset  of  
020 . 0 3 - = g .  In  the  second  half  of  the  year  the  total  effect  of  cumulated  ranking  is  given  by 
( ) 006 . 0 3 2 1 2 - = + + g g g  for positive performers, and by ( ) 014 . 0 2 1 + = +g g  for negative performers. 
This is evidence of spread risk shifting also by the reserve managers who are ranking well (to the 
extent that this is associated with positive performance), and not only by those performing below the 
benchmark, as in the case of duration risk. Past year ranking has a low base effect ( ) 003 . 0 1 = d  with a 
moderate significance level. In the second semester negative performers shift risk ( ) 015 . 0 2 1 - = +d d , 
whereas positive performers practically do not ( ) 001 . 0 3 2 1 + = + + d d d .  
In the uniform management period we find broadly similar results compared with the full sample 
regression: both interim ranking and past year ranking show an impact on current spread risk choices, 
with the same patterns as described above. It is interesting to note that in the currency specialization     21 
period the number of significant ranking coefficients diminishes, and the effect of interim ranking for 
negative performers in the second semester becomes greater (0.010 as opposed to 0.005). 
Table 8 presents the results of equation (1) as applied to Curve risk. This is affected negatively by the 
term spread and the Ted spread, and positively by bond futures volatility. Risk shifting related to 
interim ranking occurs mainly for negative performers in the second semester ( ) 068 . 0 2 1 = +g g ; it is 
practically nil for positive performers, while it reverses  ( ) 009 . 0 1 - = g  in the first semester. In the 
second part of the year we observe the usual negative effect of past year ranking on curve risk, which 
is  strong  for  negative  performers  ( 0.065)  and  much  smaller  for  positive  performers 
( ) 006 . 0 3 2 - = +d d .  
The  comparison  between  the  two  subperiods  reveals  that  currency  specialization  brings  about  a 
marked reduction in the extent of curve risk shifting related to interim ranking. In particular, in the 
second semester negative performers have a cumulative effect equal to +0.062 in the first subperiod 
and to +0.036 in the second subperiod. The corresponding effect for positive performers diminishes in 
absolute terms, from  0.007 to  0.002. These patterns are the opposite of those found for spread risk.  
Table 9 gives the results for Turnover. This variable responds inversely to the size of the term spread 
and to bond volatility. We detect a significant value of  3 g , equal to  0.157: in the second semester low 
ranking reserve managers reduce turnover, to the extent that they have achieved positive performance. 
Past year ranking has an inverse effect on turnover  ( ) 156 . 0 2 - = d ; however this effect is more than 
compensated for if the manager has achieved a positive performance  ( ) 048 . 0 3 2 = +d d . The latter 
finding  seems  consistent  with  the  notion  that,  once  reserve  managers  have  achieved  a  positive 
performance, they deploy an extra effort, e.g. in security selection, to improve their ranking position. 
The coefficient estimates for the two subperiods reveal the presence of ranking related adjustments in 
turnover only under the uniform management regime. 
To obtain a clearer picture of adjustment patterns under the two regimes, Table 10 reports summary 
evidence on the ranking related effects on risk and turnover estimated for the second semester. We 
observe that some types of risk shifting diminish under currency specialization, while others become 
greater. In the first group we can include the adjustment of curve risk following the interim ranking 
results, and of spread risk and curve risk following past year ranking.
13  We also notice that the 
adjustment of turnover to either type of ranking loses significance under currency specialization. The 
second group includes the adjustment of spread risk to the interim ranking results and that of duration 
risk to past year ranking. The first of these effects may partly be related to the increase in size and 
                                                           
13 Strictly speaking, in the subperiod 2002 2005 the lowest ranking manager has a Rank (or Last year rank) equal 
to 8, while the highest ranking manager, owing to normalization, has a value equal to (1/12 x 8=) 0.67. This 
introduces an upward bias in the size of the coefficient estimates of the first subperiod.     22 
volatility of credit spreads in the years 2006 2009 compared with the first subperiod. Overall currency 
specialization  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  the  extent  of  risk shifting  for  the  dollar  reserve 
managers. However risk shifting is still present. 
The evidence so far lends support to the view that the ECB’s reserve managers strategically adjust 
their risk taking and, to a lesser extent, turnover to changes in their relative ranking, both from the 
previous  year  and  year to date.  While  enhanced  risk taking  by  the  interim  losers  in  the  second 
semester is in line with the tournament hypothesis, the finding that low performance in the previous 
annual tournament causes a reduction in risk exposure can be attributed to the emergence of risk 
aversion   a phenomenon that seems to be absent in the mutual funds market, where the tournament is 
much less rigid and where losing the yearly tournament twice in a row is probably perceived as less 
damaging by portfolio managers. 
Next we turn to the group of estimates for the yen portfolios, presented in the same sequence as for the 
dollar. Table 11 gives the results for Duration risk. In the entire sample period this variable responds 
positively to the term spread and the OIS spread. Interim ranking has an opposite, although small, 
effect on duration risk  ( ) 004 . 0 1 - = g . No other types of risk adjustment are found. In the uniform 
management period we find that risk shifting reverses sign in the second semester  ( ) 003 . 0 2 1 = +g g , 
and that past year ranking displays a negative effect on duration risk. Under currency specialization we 
are left with a single coefficient, with mild significance, and the “wrong” sign ( ) 012 . 0 2 - = g . 
The  results  for  Spread  risk  are  given  in  Table  12.  In  this  case  low  performers  do  increase  risk 
positions, and more so in the second part of the year  ( ) 014 . 0 2 1 = +g g . Past year losers reduce spread 
risk  in  the  second  semester.  These  patterns  are  present  in  the  uniform  management  period  but 
disappear with currency specialization. 
Table 13 shows the estimates for Curve risk. While in the entire period there is no evidence of risk 
shifting, in the first subperiod we find the “familiar” tournament effects: low interim ranking causes an 
increase in risk taking, which becomes more pronounced in the second semester  ( ) 045 . 0 2 1 = +g g ; 
however  this  phenomenon  is  almost  fully  offset  by  reserve  managers  with  positive  performance 
( ) 005 . 0 3 2 1 = + + g g g . In the same subperiod, past year ranking displays a negative effect on risk 
taking  throughout  the  year  ( ) 012 . 0 1 - = d .  Under  currency  specialization  we  notice  a  significant 
coefficient on the variable H2 rank, although with an unusual negative sign. 
The results for turnover are shown in Table 14. In the full sample the only significant coefficients are 
098 . 0 3 - = g  and  032 . 0 1 - = d , presenting familiar signs. In the uniform management period there is 
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no evidence of turnover adjustment, while under currency specialization we notice a significant value 
of   1 g , equal to 0.063 and showing that interim low ranking causes an increase in effort. 
Table 15 reports summary evidence on the effects of ranking on yen portfolio risk and turnover in the 
second semester. The picture differs somewhat from the dollar case. We do not have a plausible 
explanation for the switch in the sign of the effect of interim ranking on duration risk and curve risk in 
the currency specialization years. We notice however that in those years the shifting of spread risk 
looses significance and that reserve managers adjust turnover to interim ranking instead. The effect of 
past year ranking disappears for three variables out of four. 
 
6. Individual effects 
In our stepwise test approach, we move on to release some of the assumptions used so far. In this 
section we allow for the possibility that individual effects appear not only as a constant component 
over  time,  but  also  via  different  reactions  to  the  ranking  variables.  For  this  purpose  the  panel 
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where the dummy variables  j
t i D ,  are manager specific, and range over (j, t, c) with value 1 in the 
months t when manager j is active in currency c, and 0 otherwise (the currency subscript is omitted for 
simplicity). As before, the dependent variable Y is represented alternatively by Duration risk, Spread 
risk, Curve risk, Turnover. We set out to test the hypothesis that reserve managers adjust risk positions 
and effort individually in a systematic way as a function of year to date ranking and past year ranking, 
allowing for the possibility that they modify their response in the second semester, and that they do so 
asymmetrically conditional upon achieving positive performance. This regression approach comes at 
the cost of a much larger number of coefficients to estimate, which inevitably reduces the efficiency of 
the estimates, since a large fraction of individual effects does not exist in practice and this amplifies     24 
the  standard  errors  of  the  “true”  effects.
14  The  t statistic,  even  if  downward  biased,  continues  to 
provide a reliable instrument for hypothesis testing. 
The listing of the results of the eight regressions would be overly detailed. Therefore in Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively for the dollar and the yen, we provide evidence only on the  g and  d  
coefficients from equation (2) that turned out to be significant in the two distinct subperiods, ignoring 
for simplicity the results covering the entire sample, the effects of the market variables, the constant a  
and all the insignificant coefficient estimates. To enhance readability we compiled in Table 16 a 
selection of the results for the dollar (from Appendix Table 1), where we omitted the four portfolio 
managers who have no longer been active in that currency since 2006. While we note that two dollar 
managers (M4 and M5, from Appendix Table 1) present no significant ranking effect, Table 16 shows 
a wide variety of individual effects for the remaining six dollar managers. One extreme of moderation 
in  this  group  is  represented  by  M11  who,  under  currency  specialization,  reduces  spread  risk  in 
response to a low past year ranking. At the other extreme we observe M8, who appears as a systematic 
risk  and turnover adjuster. This reserve manager displays recognizable effects: low interim ranking 
causes an increase in spread risk and curve risk in the second semester; interestingly, these effects 
become greater under currency specialization. However turnover is reduced after low year to date 
ranking.  With  two  exceptions,  this  reserve  manager  reacts  in  the  same  fashion  independently  of 
whether his return is above or below the benchmark. Looking back at the entire group of eight dollar 
managers  who  were  active  before  and  after  currency  specialization,  and  considering  the  four 
dependent variables, we have 32 combinations. As shown in Table 16, we have estimated the presence 
of one or more significant individual effects, related to either definition of ranking, in 11 cases out of 
32, or 34 per cent. We recall that this figure is, if anything, biased downwards by the regression 
approach and by the choice to present the results for the subperiods.
15 
Table 17 provides the individual effects for the yen, using the same simplified format as in Table 16. 
We observe an even greater range of estimates. As was the case with the aggregate results of Tables 
11 14,  some  of  these  individual  effects  can  be  interpreted  less  clearly  than  those  for  the  dollar. 
Managers  M11  and  M12  generally  display  regular  patterns  across  the  four  dependent  variables 
(interim ranking displays a positive coefficient, past year ranking has a negative coefficient), and in a 
number of cases they react asymmetrically depending on their position relative to the benchmark 
return.  In  the  entire  group  of  six  yen  managers  who  were  active  before  and  after  currency 
specialization, and considering the four dependent variables, we have 24 combinations. Out of these, 
                                                           
14  The  alternative  of  dropping  the  insignificant  variables  and  re estimating  the  equations  would  be  very 
cumbersome.  
15 Owing to the large number of coefficients, we do not go through the standard procedure from general to 
particular, whereby subsequent regression rounds leave out the variables that did not turn out to be significant at 
the previous stage.     25 
we have estimated the presence of one or more individual effects in 16 cases, corresponding to 67 per 
cent of the total combinations. 
To  conduct  robustness  checks  of  our  results,  we  also  performed  regressions  (1)  and  (2)  under 
alternative, milder assumptions. In particular, we ran separate regressions over reserve managers of 
both large and small portfolios.
16 These showed that those managing a large or a small portfolio 
behave differently, whereas they tend to display similar reactions within group. This phenomenon may 
partly be explained by closer scrutiny among the next of kin, and by the different flexibility afforded 
by small versus large portfolios. In achieving the same risk positions and turnover, reserve managers 
of small portfolios clearly benefit from the fact that the absolute size of the transactions involved is 
also small. 
Although showing different nuances and changes over time/individual effects, the robustness checks 
point to the same general conclusion: both aggregate regressions of type (1) and individual effect 




7. Normative considerations 
The previous empirical analysis raises two issues concerning the reserve management framework: the 
assessment horizon for portfolio choices and the structure of reputational reward. 
Recognising that investment opportunities and risk premia are time varying, and that bond returns are 
to some extent predictable,
18 once a year the top investment layer revises the strategic benchmark by 
means of a dynamic optimization process. The resulting benchmark is thus of the “active” type, since 
it  exploits  the  conditional  return  distribution  based  on  the  available  information  set  and  has  an 
investment horizon of twelve months.
19 The tactical layer in turn exploits any update in the conditional 
return distribution on a monthly basis. Third comes the actual portfolio, which adds the knowledge of 
day by day market developments. While the ECB’s guidelines state that the objective of the tactical 
                                                           
16 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
17 In separate regressions we also estimated the effect of the risk variables and of effort on contemporaneous 
performance. One might argue that outperforming a (fixed income) benchmark portfolio, dynamically reviewed 
every month, is no easy task (see e.g. Chen, Ferson and Peters, 2010) and as such there could not be any 
systematic reward to risk and effort. Outperformance would materialize occasionally as the outcome of fortunate 
market timing and security selection, and risk shifting would do little harm. Indeed, we find some cases in which 
portfolio managers display positive and significant effects of risk exposure and effort on performance. In other 
instances we find negative and significant values of the regression coefficients. The latter are an unfortunate 
indication that higher risk is not necessarily associated with higher return, which is of course nothing new in 
finance. We leave a full blown test of causality between risk decisions and performance as a subject for future 
research. The performance consequences of risk shifting in the case of US mutual funds have been analysed 
recently by Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011). 
18 See for example Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).     26 
benchmark is to outperform the strategic benchmark within an investment horizon of three months, the 
mandate of the actual portfolios is not explicit over their assessment horizon. On the one hand, the link 
with  the  accounting  results  and  general  market  practice  support the  present  choice  of  the  annual 
horizon, implicit in the reporting frequency to the Governing Council. On the other hand, it might be 
argued that owing to specialization motives, the horizon of the actual portfolios should be shorter than 
that of the tactical benchmark. By using superior short term analysis skills and information which is 
not taken into account at the tactical level, a short term orientation of the third layer of management 
would maximize the probability to add outperformance and make an efficient use of the risk budget 
(Cardon and Coche, 2004; Koivu, Monar and Nyholm, 2009). In this perspective, it could be argued 
that the appropriate horizon for the assessment of actual portfolios is one month. In principle the 
hypothesis  that  the  portfolio  horizon  is  three  months,  as  for  the  tactical  benchmark,  cannot  be 
discarded altogether. However we observe that, by analogy with the relationship between the strategic 
horizon (twelve months) and the tactical horizon (three months), the appropriate horizon going one 
step down should be shorter. To sum up, the one month horizon would seem superior to the one year 
horizon on two grounds: specialization and internal consistency. 
In the presence of stochastic returns, typically portfolio choice problems seek to specify an objective 
function for the owner of the funds, where the degree of risk tolerance plays a crucial role in finding 
the balance between risk and return. This also applies to our framework, in which the ECB’s long term 
risk/return  preferences  are  incorporated  in  the  strategic  benchmark,  while  the  medium term 
preferences against the background of market conditions steer the tactical benchmark. Thus the two 
benchmarks reflect and reveal the preferences of the decision making bodies, and tight risk limits are 
assigned to the portfolios. 
Should  risk  and  return  then  be  further  traded off  at  the  portfolio  level?  If  the  objective  of  each 
portfolio were to outperform the tactical benchmark within a one month horizon, then risk concerns by 
the portfolio managers should be confined to the effect of within month volatility of asset returns, 
which may induce managers to time the market and to perform security selection in the day by day 
investment process. In this conceptual framework there is no role for strategic risk shifting based on 
ranking and/or performance during the year or in the previous year. 
The second normative issue is related to the design of compensation. Within the current practice, 
which  basically  involves  the  award  of  reputational  credit,  an  implicit  feature  of  the  tournament 
consists in the concavity of the reward to annual performance, related to capital preservation concerns. 
These induce a degree of risk aversion at the portfolio management level which may go against the 
pursuit  of  return.  Finding  the  right  balance  between  risk  and  return  in  the  investment  of  foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
19 Van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2008) discuss the use of an unconditional (“passive”) benchmark jointly 
with strategic asset allocation decisions in a decentralized investment management framework.     27 
reserves is the task of the general rules of the framework, which we do not call into question. However 
we can point out some arguments for reviewing the award of reputation. 
A standard result in the design of optimal labour contracts is that a worker’s incentives to invest in 
effort increase with the spread between winning and losing prizes; therefore the principal would want 
to increase the spread to induce greater investment and generate higher output, subject to participation 
and cost constraints (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). In a delegated investment 
setting,  Dybvig,  Farnsworth  and  Carpenter  (2010)  have  recently  studied  the  portfolio  manager’s 
optimal compensation under the hypothesis that she exerts a costly effort to influence the quality of a 
private  signal  about  future  market  prices.
20  If  effort  is  not  observable,  the  incentive compatible 
contract gives the manager a payoff proportional to the investor’s payoff plus a fraction of the excess 
return of the portfolio over a passive benchmark. If neither the effort nor the signal are observable, 
then excess return strategies would tend to make the portfolio manager overly conservative. Thus in 
this case the optimal contract is one that rewards the manager for trading more aggressively on the 
basis of “extreme” information.  
The implication for our framework, where portfolio managers’ private signals and effort are largely 
unobservable,  is  that  the  reward  function  should  include  a  prize  for  positive  performance. 
Furthermore, to limit excessive prudence and indexing behaviour, the shape of reward should possibly 
be convex. This would elicit effort towards market timing and security selection at the level of the 
actual portfolios. 
Under the assumptions that i) the portfolio horizon should maintain a short term orientation and ii) an 
incentive compatible  reputational  reward  should  be  assigned  to  portfolio  managers,  we  ask  the 
question: can the design of performance ranking help towards those two objectives? If this were the 
case,  the  framework  could  attain  an  efficiency  improvement  even  without  changing  its  policy 
principles. 




t i i outcome f SCORE
1
, , that is the final score of 
contestant i in the tournament is computed over a suitable horizon T as the sum of a function evaluated 
at each round t. In the reserve management tournament the arguments are the individual’s positive 
outcomes (portfolio outperformance) or negative outcomes (underperformance) in each round. The 
current  formula  adopts  a  cardinal  and  linear  function  ( ) × f ,  which  returns  a  value  in  the  same 
measurement unit (basis points). There is only one round t coinciding with T (one year) or twelve 
monthly rounds (which is equivalent) with time additive scores. Letting  t i R ,  and  t b R ,  denote the 
                                                           
20 The inclusion in the model of security returns with a spanning of market states overcomes the irrelevance 
result (Stoughton, 1993; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1997), according to which benchmarking does not provide the 
right incentives and leads to underinvestment of effort.     28 
return on portfolio i and, respectively, on the benchmark, negative performance  [ ] ( ) 0 , min , , t b t i R R -  
weighs as much as positive performance  [ ] ( ) 0 , max , , t b t i R R -  at each monthly round. 
There are in principle several alternatives to the present system. We limit ourselves to a qualitative 
sketch of the “ideal” ranking mechanism, which could aim at fulfilling four objectives: 
a)  align  the  timeframe  of  investment  decisions  with  the  horizon  preferred  by  the  owner  (time 
coherence);  
b)  eliminate or limit the correlation of portfolio decisions with the past (forward orientation); 
c)  reduce the tendency of interim winners to view themselves as final winners too early during the 
year (effort); 
d)  encourage the intermediate performers, as well as the losers, to make the best use of their risk 
budgets (risk-taking). 
For simplicity we present two possible options. They would keep the monthly observation frequency 
and the yearly assessment horizon T as at present. 
Option 1 – Each round t lasts one month. The function  ( ) × f  remains cardinal but it presents a convex 
kink, by assigning a score of 0 to underperformance (the negative outcome). 
Option 2 - Each round lasts one month as before. The function  ( ) × f  is ordinal and mildly convex. The 
positive outcomes are defined as the top N/2 performance values, N being the number of portfolio 
managers (if not an integer, N/2 might be rounded down). The first dollar (yen) manager would obtain 
(the  integer  part  of)  N/2  points,  the  second  would  get  N/2 1,  …,  down  to  zero  for  the  portfolio 
managers with the lower N/2 performances. Alternatively, the positive outcomes might be defined as 
the top N/2 conditional on achieving outperformance. 
The two options present an increasing order of reward to effort and risk taking. The system currently 
in use does not seem to promote time coherence and forward orientation by the managers. By ignoring 
all negative performance months, Option 1 would break the intertemporal substitutability of outcomes, 
thus eliciting greater time coherence, effort and risk taking. Option 2, by adopting the ordinal function, 
would introduce an additional incentive to risk taking and the pursuit of a better performance. For 
example, the top scorer would get one more point compared with the second one, no matter how close 
the latter is. This option could make a contribution to all four objectives. 
 
8. Conclusions 
We have presented the main features of the investment framework for the ECB’s foreign reserves and 
provided empirical evidence on the relationships among portfolio risk choices, managerial effort and     29 
relative performance. A peculiar tournament takes place among reserve managers, who are located at 
different national central banks and share a common benchmark. We have empirically found that the 
tournament hypothesis extensively studied in the literature on the mutual fund industry holds also in 
our case. Interim losers increase relative risk in the second half of the year in an attempt to catch up, 
while interim winners in some cases reduce risk and tend to follow more closely the benchmark to 
lock in  their  gains. We  also  found  that  the impact of ranking  may  be  asymmetric, depending  on 
whether the reserve manager has achieved a positive performance against the benchmark. In a number 
of cases those that are outperforming the benchmark lessen the extent of risk adjustment, consistently 
with  the  managers’  narrative  according  to  which  outperforming  the  benchmark  is  the  primary 
objective for most of them, while ranking takes only second place.  
Effort, as proxied by turnover, is significantly affected by ranking, particularly in the yen case and 
since the move to currency specialization. More generally, to the extent that the act of risk taking 
involves  more  hard  work,  as  suggested  in  the  literature,  our  risk shifting  evidence  reinforces  the 
conclusion that reserve managers shift effort on the basis of ranking as well. 
The  finding  that  past  year  losers  reduce  risk  seems  an  original  feature  of  the  ECB’s  reserve 
management  tournament.  We  have  discussed  this  evidence  in  relation  to  a  reward  function  of 
reputational nature over annual performance, described by some portfolio managers as being concave. 
Our results, showing for the first time evidence of strategic risk shifting in a high grade bond portfolio 
contest, offer proof of the pervasiveness of tournament incentives even in an environment which 
features low volatility and contained risk budgets. This may have implications also for the private 
sector, where bond portfolios benefit from greater risk taking opportunities. Future research could thus 
further explore the tournament behaviour of bond mutual funds, in view of their importance in the 
global financial market. 
In the ECB foreign reserves case, our exploratory analysis of the appropriate horizon for investment 
decisions and the structure of reward suggests that a review of the ranking system might better align 
the  incentives  offered  to  portfolio  managers  with  the  ECB’s  preferences.  A  new  solution  could 
increase the reputational reward for effort and performance via a convex scoring system linked to 
monthly, rather than annual, results. 
With a view to aligning incentives and preferences, more innovative changes could be considered. 
These would however involve some revision of the general principles of the investment framework, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Although the delegated setting of the ECB is unique, there are very important similarities with the 
practices of other monetary authorities, in terms of investment objectives, eligible asset classes, risk 
control principles, etc. By examining the ECB’s case, we have shown in detail how one member in the 
community of foreign exchange reserve managers acts to fulfil its institutional duties.     30 
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USD JPY Total
1999 28  7 24
2000 10 2 9
2001 6 0.4 5
2002  4 9  3
2003 6  1 5
2004 0.2  7  1
2005 19 2 16
2006 11 4 10
2007 5 0.1 4
2008 41 22 37
2009 28 8 23
2010 10 8 9
Average 13.3 3.4 11.6
Returns over benchmark, basis points.
Table 1: Performance of ECB foreign reserve management
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Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
M1 Duration risk 96 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.76
Spread risk 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.35
Curve risk 0.30 0.22 0.04 1.43
Turnover 2.80 1.85 0.51 8.92
M2 Duration risk 48 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12
Spread risk 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.39
Curve risk 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.56
Turnover 3.92 1.76 1.27 8.04
M3 Duration risk 96 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.34
Spread risk 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.14
Curve risk 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.41
Turnover 2.89 1.83 0.36 7.91
M4 Duration risk 96 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.20
Spread risk 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.15
Curve risk 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.25
Turnover 3.45 1.50 0.95 13.19
M5 Duration risk 96 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.31
Spread risk 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06
Curve risk 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.53
Turnover 2.66 1.00 0.29 4.20
M6 Duration risk 48 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.25
Spread risk 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.43
Curve risk 0.41 0.47 0.00 1.90
Turnover 8.26 4.52 1.77 18.19
M7 Duration risk 96 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.16
Spread risk 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.21
Curve risk 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.43
Turnover 4.82 2.39 0.40 13.36
M8 Duration risk 96 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.24
Spread risk 0.21 0.26 0.00 1.28
Curve risk 0.59 0.52 0.02 2.51
Turnover 0.49 0.84 0.00 4.78
M9 Duration risk 96 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.46
Spread risk 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.20
Curve risk 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.69
Turnover 5.55 2.48 1.12 11.81
M10 Duration risk 48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Spread risk 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06
Curve risk 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.20
Turnover 1.56 0.59 0.38 3.17
M11 Duration risk 96 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.27
Spread risk 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.18
Curve risk 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.52
Turnover 2.71 1.13 0.39 5.21
M12 Duration risk 48 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
Spread risk 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.15
Curve risk 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.52
Turnover 4.19 1.67 1.03 7.69
Duration risk, Spread risk and Curve risk are in duration contribution years. Turnover is a ratio over portfolio size
Table 2: USD dependent variables   Summary statistics
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Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
M1 Duration risk 48 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.39
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Curve risk 0.24 0.16 0.07 0.82
Turnover 0.53 0.54 0.00 2.31
M2 Duration risk 96 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.32
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.41 0.20 0.05 1.02
Turnover 0.61 0.45 0.02 3.13
M3 Duration risk 48 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.17
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.32
Turnover 0.36 0.33 0.00 1.25
M4 Duration risk 48 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.13
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.31
Turnover 1.45 1.96 0.04 7.57
M5 Duration risk 48 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.24
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.28 0.19 0.03 0.76
Turnover 0.76 0.66 0.06 3.17
M6 Duration risk 96 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.33
Spread risk 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.23
Curve risk 0.51 0.36 0.11 1.60
Turnover 1.57 1.28 0.02 7.79
M7 Duration risk 48 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.25
Spread risk 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.23
Curve risk 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.63
Turnover 0.29 0.39 0.01 2.59
M8 Duration risk 48 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.28
Spread risk 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.68
Curve risk 0.68 0.37 0.25 1.57
Turnover 1.51 2.30 0.00 10.84
M9 Duration risk 96 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.21
Spread risk 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.17
Curve risk 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.58
Turnover 1.01 0.94 0.05 4.55
M10 Duration risk 96 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.18
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.64
Turnover 0.34 0.34 0.00 2.31
M11 Duration risk 96 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.25
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.57
Turnover 0.53 0.52 0.01 4.12
M12 Duration risk 96 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.27
Spread risk 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
Curve risk 0.43 0.42 0.03 1.70
Turnover 0.49 0.44 0.00 1.65
Duration risk, Spread risk and Curve risk are in duration contribution years. Turnover is a ratio over portfolio size
Table 3: JPY dependent variables   Summary statistics
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Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Term spread 96 1.35 0.95  0.15 2.70
Ted spread 0.53 0.55 0.12 3.14
Bond volatility 6.92 2.52 3.00 14.10
All variables are in percentage points.
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Term spread 96 1.05 0.24 0.49 1.64
OIS spread 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.73
Bond volatility 3.81 1.32 1.40 7.60
All variables are in percentage points.
Table 4: USD market variables   Summary statistics
Table 5: JPY market variables   Summary statistics
     36 
Term spread -1  0.014 ***  0.008  0.019 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Ted spread -1  0.015 *** 0.016  0.019 **
(0.005) (0.034) (0.008)
Bond volatility -1 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Rank -1 0.000  0.002 * 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
H2 rank 0.006 *** 0.004 ** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
H2 above bmk  0.006 ***  0.004 *  0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Last year rank  0.001 0.001  0.008 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
H2 last year  0.006 ***  0.004 **  0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
H2 last above 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
constant 0.066 *** 0.040 ** 0.105 ***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.017)
obs 948 564 384
groups 12 12 8
R
2 0.050 0.028 0.109
Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Duration risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1 0.007  0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Ted spread -1  0.024 ***  0.187 **  0.013 **
(0.008) (0.081) (0.006)
Bond volatility -1 0.005 * 0.005 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Rank -1  0.009 ***  0.015 ***  0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
H2 rank 0.023 *** 0.020 *** 0.010 ***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
H2 above bmk  0.020 ***  0.014 ***  0.008 ***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Last year rank 0.003 * 0.003  0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
H2 last year  0.018 ***  0.015 ***  0.007 **
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
H2 last above 0.016 *** 0.012 *** 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
constant 0.062 *** 0.136 *** 0.056 ***
(0.015) (0.042) (0.012)
obs 948 564 384




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Spread risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
2002 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
currency specialization
2006 2009





Table 6: Duration risk   USD portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
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Term spread -1  0.028 **  0.056 **  0.003
(0.014) (0.025) (0.017)
Ted spread -1  0.045 **  0.387 **  0.035 **
(0.018) (0.170) (0.017)
Bond volatility -1 0.016 *** 0.028 *** 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Rank -1  0.009 **  0.015 ***  0.009 *
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
H2 rank 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.045 ***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
H2 above bmk  0.069 ***  0.069 ***  0.038 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Last year rank 0.003 0.001  0.008 *
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
H2 last year  0.065 ***  0.064 ***  0.033 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
H2 last above 0.059 *** 0.059 *** 0.027 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
constant 0.169 *** 0.245 *** 0.308 ***
(0.033) (0.089) (0.036)
obs 948 564 384
groups 12 12 8
R
2 0.137 0.159 0.142
Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Curve risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1  0.244 *  0.277  0.581 ***
(0.126) (0.202) (0.199)
Ted spread -1  0.234  0.065  0.074
(0.163) (1.373) (0.196)
Bond volatility -1  0.125 **  0.106  0.071
(0.053) (0.082) (0.072)
Rank -1  0.019  0.101 **  0.006
(0.037) (0.046) (0.057)
H2 rank 0.100  0.028 0.105
(0.063) (0.082) (0.097)
H2 above bmk  0.157 **  0.036  0.125
(0.069) (0.094) (0.101)
Last year rank  0.004  0.080 **  0.073
(0.030) (0.039) (0.052)
H2 last year  0.156 ***  0.087  0.077
(0.059) (0.070) (0.109)
H2 last above 0.204 *** 0.142 * 0.104
(0.061) (0.074) (0.110)
constant 4.860 *** 5.902 *** 4.474 ***
(0.295) (0.722) (0.416)
obs 948 564 384




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Turnover. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
2002 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
2002 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
Table 9: Turnover   USD portfolios
Table 8: Curve risk   USD portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
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2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
Negative 
performers
γ1+γ2 0.002 0 0.005 0.010 0.062 0.036  0.101 0
Positive 
performers
γ1+γ2+γ3  0.002 0  0.009 0.002  0.007  0.002  0.101 0
Negative 
performers
δ1+δ2  0.004  0.008  0.015  0.007  0.064  0.041  0.080 0
Positive 
performers
δ1+δ2+δ3 0  0.008  0.003 0  0.005  0.014 0.062 0




Table 10: Ranking effects in second semester   USD portfolios
Duration risk Spread risk Curve risk Turnover
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Term spread -1 0.029 ** 0.030 ** 0.089 ***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.030)
Ted spread -1 0.050 **  1.126 *** 0.149 ***
(0.020) (0.309) (0.029)
Bond volatility -1 0.000  0.003 0.008 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Rank -1  0.004 **  0.004 * 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
H2 rank 0.002 0.007 *  0.012 *
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
H2 above bmk  0.004  0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Last year rank 0.001 0.001  0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
H2 last year  0.003  0.006 *** 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
H2 last above 0.001 0.003  0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
constant 0.072 *** 0.134 ***  0.058
(0.015) (0.018) (0.037)
obs 852 564 288
groups 12 12 6
R
2 0.037 0.057 0.199
Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Duration risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1  0.029 ***  0.025  0.016
(0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
Ted spread -1  0.030  0.540  0.005
(0.018) (0.343) (0.011)
Bond volatility -1  0.001  0.002  0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Rank -1 0.009 *** 0.015 *** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
H2 rank 0.005 * 0.008 * 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
H2 above bmk  0.002  0.004  0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Last year rank 0.002 * 0.003 ** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
H2 last year  0.004 *  0.006 **  0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
H2 last above 0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
constant 0.019 0.014 0.029 **
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014)
obs 852 564 288




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Spread risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 11: Duration risk   JPY portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
2002 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
currency specialization
2006 2009
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Term spread -1  0.001  0.127 *** 0.425 ***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.081)
Ted spread -1 0.132 *  1.910 * 0.631 ***
(0.072) (0.996) (0.079)
Bond volatility -1  0.030 ***  0.014 *  0.038 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Rank -1 0.002 0.015 ** 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
H2 rank 0.009 0.030 **  0.040 **
(0.011) (0.012) (0.020)
H2 above bmk  0.013  0.040 *** 0.027
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023)
Last year rank  0.004  0.012 ***  0.013
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011)
H2 last year 0.000  0.011 0.034 *
(0.008) (0.007) (0.020)
H2 last above  0.009 0.009  0.031
(0.008) (0.008) (0.022)
constant 0.428 *** 0.622 ***  0.101
(0.054) (0.057) (0.100)
obs 852 564 288
groups 12 12 6
R
2 0.050 0.157 0.238
Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Curve risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1  0.690 ***  0.297  0.917 ***
(0.163) (0.243) (0.251)
Ted spread -1  0.505 *  7.614  1.488 ***
(0.288) (5.353) (0.246)
Bond volatility -1  0.016  0.063 0.042
(0.029) (0.041) (0.031)
Rank -1  0.007  0.039 0.063 **
(0.027) (0.038) (0.028)
H2 rank 0.052 0.043  0.012
(0.045) (0.066) (0.061)
H2 above bmk  0.098 **  0.068  0.055
(0.049) (0.072) (0.071)
Last year rank  0.032 *  0.016  0.013
(0.018) (0.024) (0.034)
H2 last year  0.035  0.028 0.007
(0.030) (0.039) (0.062)
H2 last above 0.046 0.020 0.024
(0.032) (0.041) (0.069)
constant 1.858 *** 1.868 *** 1.851 ***
(0.215) (0.308) (0.311)
obs 852 564 288




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Turnover. Robust standard errors in
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 13: Curve risk   JPY portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
2002 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
Table 14: Turnover   JPY portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
2002 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
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2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
Negative 
performers
γ1+γ2 0.003  0.012 0.023 0 0.045  0.040 0 0.063
Positive 
performers
γ1+γ2+γ3 0.003  0.012 0.023 0 0.005  0.040 0 0.063
Negative 
performers
δ1+δ2  0.006 0  0.003 0  0.012 0.034 0 0
Positive 
performers
δ1+δ2+δ3  0.006 0  0.003 0  0.012 0.034 0 0




Table 15: Ranking effects in second semester   JPY portfolios
Duration risk Spread risk Curve risk Turnover
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2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
M1 Negative pfm  0.004
Positive pfm  0.062  0.004
Negative pfm  0.011  0.033
Positive pfm 0.069  0.011  0.033
M3 Negative pfm  0.009 0.019
Positive pfm  0.009 0.019
Negative pfm
Positive pfm
M7 Negative pfm 1.740
Positive pfm  0.014
Negative pfm 0.438  0.657
Positive pfm 0.438 1.194
M8 Negative pfm 0 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.085  0.209
Positive pfm 0 0.008 0.027 0.016 0.085  0.209
Negative pfm  0.009  0.027  0.013  0.096  0.047  0.141
Positive pfm  0.009 0.028  0.030  0.096  0.047  0.141
M9 Negative pfm
Positive pfm
Negative pfm  0.016  0.439  0.379
Positive pfm  0.016  0.439  0.379
M11 Negative pfm
Positive pfm
Negative pfm  0.013
Positive pfm  0.013
Selection by portfolio manager of estimates from Appendix Table 1, conditional on keeping the USD under currency specialization
and showing at least one significant coefficient across risk variables and regimes, at 10% level or better.
Rank
Last year rank
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2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
M2 Negative pfm  0.017 0.054
Positive pfm  0.017
Negative pfm  0.085
Positive pfm  0.085
M6 Negative pfm  0.020  0.040  0.351 0.202
Positive pfm  0.020 0.357  0.351 0.202
Negative pfm 0.022 0.213
Positive pfm 0.022  0.567 0.213
M9 Negative pfm  0.026  0.823
Positive pfm  0.026  0.823
Negative pfm  0.014 0.049 0.669
Positive pfm  0.014 0.049 0.669
M10 Negative pfm  0.066
Positive pfm 0.037
Negative pfm  0.035  0.011
Positive pfm  0.035  0.057  0.011
M11 Negative pfm 0.033 0.057  0.244
Positive pfm  0.028 0.033  0.017  0.244
Negative pfm  0.027  0.053
Positive pfm  0.002 0.015
M12 Negative pfm 0.023 0.064 0.127 0.141
Positive pfm 0.023 0.005  0.098 0.141
Negative pfm 0.030  0.079  0.251
Positive pfm 0.030  0.002  0.139
Selection by portfolio manager of estimates from Appendix Table 2, conditional on keeping the JPY under currency specialization
and showing at least one significant coefficient across risk variables and regimes, at 10% level or better.
Rank
Last year rank












Duration risk    44 
curr 
spec
Rank M1 yes 0.026 ***
M2  0.015 **  0.287 **
M3 yes  0.009 * 0.019 **
M4 yes
M5 yes
M6  0.007 **  0.031 ***  0.058 ***  0.671 ***
M7 yes











M7 yes 1.740 **











M7 yes  1.754 *





Last year rank M1 yes  0.036 ***  0.033 *
M2  0.024 **  0.292 *
M3 yes 0.017 ***
M4 yes
M5 yes
M6  0.006 **  0.212 **
M7 yes 0.438 * 1.224 ***
M8 yes 0.006 *** 0.021 ***  0.141 *









M6  0.043 **
M7 yes  1.882 *
M8 yes  0.015 ***  0.048 ***  0.013 ***  0.096 ***  0.047 ***
M9 yes
M10
M11 yes  0.013 *
M12






M7 yes 1.851 *






2 0.173 0.165 0.335 0.403 0.300 0.307 0.265 0.306
Fixed effects estimates of equation (2). The coefficients of the market variables and the constant are omitted for simplicity. The "curr spec" column
indicates whether the portfolio manager kept a USD portfolio under currency specialization. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
2006 2009
Curve risk Turnover
Appendix Table 1: Individual effects   USD portfolios
2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
Duration risk Spread risk
2002 2005




M2 yes  0.017 * 0.054 **
M3
M4  0.883 ***
M5 0.020 ***
M6 yes  0.020 ***  0.351 *** 0.202 ***
M7
M8  0.016 *** 0.066 *** 0.060 *** 0.459 ***
M9 yes  0.026 *  0.823 ***
M10 yes
M11 yes 0.033 *** 0.057 **  0.244 **
M12 yes  0.082 *** 0.141 **





M6 yes  0.040 *
M7 0.036 ***
M8 0.031 *** 0.027 *** 0.087 ***
M9 yes
M10 yes  0.066 *
M11 yes
M12 yes 0.023 * 0.064 *** 0.209 ***





M6 yes 0.396 ***
M7
M8  0.030 **  0.087 ***  0.234 ***  0.496 **
M9 yes
M10 yes 0.103 ***
M11 yes  0.028 *  0.074 *
M12 yes  0.060 **  0.225 ***
Last year rank M1  0.017 **  0.043 **
M2 yes  0.085 **
M3
M4 0.028 *  0.172 **
M5  0.016 ***  0.225 **
M6 yes 0.022 *** 0.213 *
M7 0.012 ***
M8 0.011 ***  0.021 **
M9 yes  0.014 * 0.049 *** 0.669 ***
M10 yes  0.035 ***  0.111 ***
M11 yes  0.053 ***
M12 yes  0.013 **  0.135 ***






M7  0.024 ***
M8  0.020 ***  0.035 ***  0.056 ***
M9 yes
M10 yes
M11 yes  0.027 *
M12 yes  0.017 **  0.079 ***  0.117 ***





M6 yes  0.567 ***
M7 0.013 *
M8 0.032 *** 0.070 ***
M9 yes
M10 yes  0.057 ***
M11 yes 0.025 * 0.068 *
M12 yes 0.077 *** 0.112 ***
R
2 0.288 0.401 0.519 0.127 0.530 0.3755 0.360 0.282
Fixed effects estimates of equation (2). The coefficients of the market variables and the constant are omitted for simplicity. The "curr spec" column
indicates whether the portfolio manager kept a JPY portfolio under currency specialization. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
2006 2009
Curve risk Turnover
Appendix Table 2: Individual effects   JPY portfolios
2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009 2002 2005 2006 2009
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